Although analyst forecasts are one of the most critical thresholds for setting market expectations, the meeting of analyst forecasts is not always followed by a positive market reaction. In this study,
'Other Information' as an Explanatory Factor for the Market's Reactions to Firms'
Meeting or Beating Analyst Forecasts
Introduction
The market reaction to firms' meeting or beating analyst forecasts has drawn significant attention from regulators and academics in recent years. Generally, the extant literature finds that future earnings are higher for those firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts than those firms that miss analyst forecasts. Further, the market tends to react positively to firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts and negatively to firms that fall short of analyst forecasts (Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002) . The literature, however, also documents that positive earnings surprises are not always followed by positive market reactions (McCafferty, 1997; Pulliam, 1999; Kinney et al., 2002; Song and Pitre, 2006) . In fact, in a sample of firms from 1989 to 2004, I find that 49 percent of firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts are followed by negative market reactions and 39 percent of firms that miss analyst forecasts are followed by positive market reactions.
1 Kothari (2001) proposes two explanations for the unexpected market reactions to earnings surprises. First, price captures information beyond that of earnings. Dechow et al. (1999) and Bryan and Tiras (2007) empirically test the extent to which the inclusion of 'other information' improves upon the descriptiveness of valuation models. 2 Moreover, non-earnings information, such as customer satisfaction and order backlog, has implications for future earnings but are not reflected in current earnings (Ittner and 1 I use "the unexpected sign of the earnings-return relation" and "the seemingly counterintuitive reactions by the market" interchangeably to account for this phenomenon. 2 Following Ohslon (1995) , 'other information' is defined as information about future abnormal earnings not contained in earnings and book value. I use other information and non-earnings information interchangeably throughout this paper. Larcker, 1998; Myers, 1999; Rajgopal et al., 2003) . These non-earnings leading indicators, however, are captured by stock price. The prior literature has also shown that firms' expanded disclosure and conference calls have had an impact on the market reactions to earnings surrounding earnings announcement (Francis et al., 2002; Kimbrough, 2005) . Collectively, unfavorable 'other information' is likely to negate positive earnings surprises, thus resulting in the market reacting negatively to firms that meet or beat analyst expectations. Accordingly, favorable 'other information' may counter against the effects of negative earnings surprises, which would likely lead to positive market reactions to firms that miss analyst forecasts. Kothari's (2001) second explanation for unexpected market reactions is that transitory components of earnings are increasing.
3
Prior literature has shown that abnormal accruals add noise to earnings and thus have an impact on stock returns (Guay et al. 1996 ; among others). Xie (2001) further finds that abnormal accruals are negatively associated with earnings persistence. Taken together, the extant literature indicates that earnings may have become noisier and more transitory (less persistent) due to increasing abnormal accruals. The market discounts earnings information when abnormal accruals are high and thus responds negatively to firms that satisfy analyst expectations (McGee, 1997; Pulliam, 1999; Song and Pitre, 2006) . As a result, I use abnormal accruals to proxy for transitory components in earnings to respond to Kothari's second explanation.
In this study, I test whether Kothari's (2001) (Hand, 1990) . The consequences of capital concerns for meeting or beating analyst forecasts seem to have been overemphasized.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and section 3 is hypothesis development and measurement of variables. Section 4 describes the sample and provides the empirical evidence. Section 5 presents the results of sensitivity tests, followed by the conclusion in section 6.
Literature Review
Meeting or beating the market expectations has been considered one of management's most important tasks (Degorge et al., 1999) . Among earnings benchmarks (zero, past earnings and analyst earnings forecast), the literature has focused on analyst earnings forecast as the most critical threshold of managers (Brown, 2001; Dechow et al., 2003; Graham et al., 2005 Others demonstrate that the managers' motivation to meet or beat analyst forecasts is related to capital market concerns. Matsumoto (2002) documents a positive association between institutional ownership and the managers' incentives to meet or beat analyst forecasts, and a positive relation between stakeholders' implicit claims and managers' incentive to meeting or beating analysts' forecasts. Bartov et al. (2002) maintain that the market reacts positively to firms that meet or beat analyst expectations regardless of how frequently firms meet the threshold and whether firms engage in earnings management to exceed the earnings benchmark. Skinner and Sloan (2002) point out that there exists an asymmetric market reaction between positive and negative earnings surprises. The magnitude of the market reactions to a negative earnings surprise is larger than that of the market reactions to a positive earnings surprise.
Some studies associated with capital market concerns, however, argue that meeting or beating analyst expectations is not always followed by positive market reactions. Kinney et al. (2002) show that less than two-thirds of firms that satisfy analyst expectations receive positive market reactions. Similarly, they find that no more than two-thirds of firms that miss analyst forecasts generate negative market reactions. They claim that this phenomenon is a result of an S-shaped earnings-return relation, which is associated with dispersion of analyst forecasts. The anecdotal evidence is consistent with Kinney et al.'s (2002) findings. Pulliam (1999) , for instance, reports that American
Express and Pitney Bowes both generated negative market reactions when they satisfied analyst expectations, claiming the market assessed earnings quality as low when valuing these firms' meeting or beating analyst forecasts. McCafferty (1997) indicates that Sybase and Fruit of the Loom both received positive market reactions when they fell short of analyst forecasts. McGee (1997) argues that the unexpected sign of the earningsreturn relation may be due to the fact that the market focuses more on earnings stability than on firms' meeting or beating analyst projections.
A related study, Song and Pitre (2006) , document that earnings management and firm size can account for the unexpected sign between the market reactions and earnings surprises. Unique from their study, I first employ a comprehensive measure of nonearnings information to address that the market values information beyond earnings and then point out the specific pieces of other information that them market uses in gauging firms' meeting or beating analyst forecasts. Both papers differ in terms of focus and research design. The difference between research designs is addressed in section 3.
Hypothesis Development and Variables

Hypothesis Development
Ohlson (1995) models firm value, proxied by market price ( it P ), as a function of earnings ( it X ), book value ( it BV ) and other information ( it υ ). This is illustrated in equation (1) below:
where it P = market price of equity in year t; it X = income before extraordinary items minus preferred dividends in year t, divided by shares outstanding;
it BV = book value of equity in year t; it υ = other information in year t, which is information about future abnormal earnings not currently captured by earnings and book value; R = discount rate; ω = persistence of abnormal earnings; γ = persistence of other information.
Earnings in equation (1) can be decomposed into cash flow from operations (CFO it ), normal accruals (NACC it ), and abnormal accruals (ABACC it ), where the individual persistence of these components determines how the component relates to market prices. Since the persistence of cash flow from operations, normal accruals and abnormal accruals all differ, the market weights on each of these components will also differ (Xie, 2001) .
Within the context of this model, Kothari's (2001) first explanation for the seemingly counterintuitive results is represented by other information ( it υ ). The higher 5 Ohlson (1995) also included dividends in his relation, but other studies (Dechow et al., 1999, and Bryan and Tiras, 2007) drop dividends as a non-influential variable. To be consistent with their studies, I exclude dividends in the equation (1). the it υ , the greater the expected positive market reaction to earnings. On the other hand, abnormal accruals can be viewed as transitory components in earnings, which represents Kothari's second explanation for the seemingly counterintuitive results. The market tends to discount earnings information when abnormal accruals are high (Guay et al. 1996; Balsam et al., 2002; Bartov et al., 2002) . To date, the literature has found evidence supporting only Kothari's second point represented by abnormal accruals; therefore, I
include tests of the abnormal accruals explanation as a control variable for testing Kothari's first explanation.
To investigate whether other information and abnormal accruals together account for the seemingly unexpected market reactions to firms' meeting or missing analyst forecasts, I use a multinomial logit model to distinguish between four outcomes. 
where i Y is the outcome depending on signs of earnings surprises and abnormal returns. j = 0 is the base outcome that firms fall short of analyst forecasts and generate negative abnormal returns (group D), j = 1 is the situation where firms satisfy analyst forecasts and receive positive abnormal returns (group A), j = 2 denotes firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts but have negative abnormal returns (group B) and j = 3 indicates the outcome that firms miss analyst forecasts while generating positive abnormal returns (group C). X is a vector of explanatory variables and α is the corresponding coefficient of X to outcome j.
The multinomial logit regression is shown in equation (4):
where j = 0 if firms that miss analyst forecasts generate negative abnormal returns; j = 1 if firms that satisfy analyst forecasts generate positive abnormal returns; j = 2 if firms that satisfy analyst forecasts generate negative abnormal returns; j = 3 if firms that miss analyst forecasts generate positive abnormal returns; To measure abnormal accruals, I follow the procedure of Xie (2001) 
where it TA = total accruals for sample firm i in year t; 1 − it A = total assets for sample firm i in year t -1; it ∆Rev = change in net revenue for sample firm i in year t; it PPE = gross property plant and equipment for sample firm i in year t; it e = residual for sample firm i in year t. Consistent with Xie (2001) , I deflate all variables by total assets at the beginning of the period and run cross-sectional regressions for the Jones (1991) winsorize all relevant variables at top and bottom one percent levels.
To determine whether a firm meets or beats analyst forecasts, I use unadjusted analyst earnings forecasts to avoid rounding errors of earnings due to stock-split adjustments (Payne and Thomas, 2003) . A firm is viewed as meeting or beating analyst forecasts if its reported earnings per share is equal to or greater than the most recent 7 Financial institutions and utility firms operate in a special business environment, which makes their accounting figures less comparable to firms in the other industries. 8 The use of the statement of cash flow approach to estimate total accruals limits data to be available from 1988 and the requirement of one-year lag variables makes the sample start from 1989.
analyst forecast prior to earnings announcement. To determine whether the market reacts positively or negatively to firms' meeting or beating analyst forecasts, I follow Kasznik and McNichols (2002) , using buy-and-hold value-weighted abnormal returns to measure the market response. 9 The return period is twelve months, ending in the month of earnings announcement in year t.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the key variables are shown in Table 2 . The mean difference of the key variables between firms that meet or beat analyst expectations and firms that miss analyst forecasts are statistically different at one percent level, except cash flow from operations ( CFO ). Overall, firms that meet or beat analyst forecasts have higher earnings, higher other information, higher long-run growth, higher beta, lower normal accruals, lower abnormal accruals and lower analyst dispersion than firms that miss analyst forecasts. Kinney et al. (2002) and Song and Pitre (2006) and supports my contention that the market does not value firms solely based on whether they meet or beat analyst forecasts but also take other factors into account. Further analysis indicates that the percentage of firms with the unexpected sign of the earningsreturn relation is not trivial over time. In H1, I posit that the market considers other information when valuing firms' meeting or beating analyst forecasts. Therefore, the observed negative market reactions to firms' meeting or beating analyst forecasts could be due to lower other information and the positive market reactions to firms that miss analyst expectations could be a result of higher other information. The evidence in Table 5 demonstrates that the coefficient of other information in group A is higher than that in group B ( I also hypothesize that the market reacts negatively to firms that meet or beat analyst expectations because those firms are found to achieve the earnings benchmark by earnings manipulation. I find no evidence, however, that abnormal accruals can explain the unexpected sign of the earnings-return relation. The coefficient on abnormal accruals in group A is greater than that in group B ( Table 6 provides the empirical results. I find that the market values a firm's long-run growth, beta, earnings persistence, loss, price decrease from prior year and size when assessing firms' meeting or beating analyst expectations.
Empirical Results
Sensitivity Tests
Alternative measure of other information
As an alternative to the measure for other information above, I also test the metric 
Conclusion
Although analyst forecasts are one of the most critical thresholds for setting market expectations, the meeting of analyst forecasts is not always followed by a positive market reaction. In this study, I find that 49 percent of firms that meet or beat analyst expectations generate negative market reactions and 39 percent of firms that miss analyst forecasts receive positive market reactions. I investigate whether the unexpected sign of the earnings-return relation is due to two factors: 1) the market values information beyond earnings when valuing firms' meeting or beating analyst expectations; and 2) the market considers transitory components in earnings, which is proxied by abnormal accruals.
I find that other information can explain the seemingly counterintuitive reactions by the market to firms' meeting or beating analyst forecasts, which supports the argument that information not captured by accounting fundamentals, such as customer satisfaction, patent, a firm's long-run growth, beta, earnings persistence, loss, price decrease from prior year and size, is related to firms' future earnings and valued by the market.
However, I do not find the evidence of abnormal accruals in explaining the unexpected sign of the earnings-return relation, which suggests that the market does fully incorporate information in abnormal accruals in assessing firms' meeting or beating analyst expectations.
This paper fills a void of MBE literature by establishing the link between other information and the market reactions to firms' meeting or beating analyst expectations.
Prior studies on this line of literature have focused on earnings information while have ignored the impact of non-earnings information on the market when valuing firms' meeting or beating analyst forecasts. This study shows that the market does not functionally fixate on earnings. Overall, the capital market concern for meeting or beating analyst expectations seems to have been overemphasized. Future research may extend this paper to investigate the market pricing of other information. Whether the market reacts to other information correctly is still unknown.
Some argue that the market overprices other information while the others indicate the underpricing of other information. Therefore, it would be interesting to explore how these four groups of firms perform in the long run. In addition, it may be worthwhile examining how the market values the quality of other information. Prior literature has shed lights on earnings quality and voluntary disclosure quality while little is known about how the market values the quality of other information. It would be beneficial to understand the interactions among the qualities of earnings, voluntary disclosure and other information so as to enhance the quality of financial reporting.
Meet/Beat
Miss
The variables are defied as follows: Meet/Beat = meet or beat analyst forecasts, a firm is classified as meeting or beating analyst forecasts if its reported earnings per share is equal to or greater than the most recent analyst earnings forecast prior to earnings announcement in year t; Miss = miss analyst forecasts, a firm is classified as missing analyst forecasts if its reported earnings per share is lower than the most recent analyst earnings forecast prior to earnings announcement in year t; VBHAR = value-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal return, where return interval is a twelve-month period ending in the month of earnings announcement for year t. 
15,646 Delete firm-year observations with missing CRSP data
Final Sample
Delete firm-year observations with missing I/B/E/S data Delete financial institutions, utility firms and firm-year observations with negative book value and the number of analyst following less than three EP = earnings persistence, the first order autoregression coefficient for earnings over the last eight years; PREC = forecast precision, measured as one divided by the number of analyst following; PD = price decrease, an indicator variable, coded as 1 if the change in price from the last year is negative; Size = the log of total assets. Loss = accounting loss, an indicator variable, coded as 1 when a loss occurs; *,**,*** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance DISP = dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts, measured as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in year t; LTG = consensus analyst forecasts of long-run growth, measured in the month following earnings announcement; Beta = beta, estimated by the market model with daily return for year t-1; CFO = cash flow from operations, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; NACC = normal accruals, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; ABACC = abnormal accruals, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; v = other information, scaled by market equity at the end of year t;
Difference (Positive vs Negative)
The variables are defied as follows:
BV = book value of equity, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; X = income before extraordinary items, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t;
The sample covers 15,646 firm-year observations between 1989 and 2004. Table 3 (continued) DISP = dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts, measured as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in year t; LTG = consensus analyst forecasts of long-run growth, measured in the month following earnings announcement; Beta = beta, estimated by the market model with daily return for year t-1; EP = earnings persistence, the first order autoregression coefficient for earnings over the last eight years;
The variables are defied as follows: X = income before extraordinary items, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; BV = book value of equity, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; CFO = cash flow from operations, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; PREC = forecast precision, measured as one divided by the number of analyst following; Loss = accounting loss, an indicator variable, coded as 1 when a loss occurs; PD = price decrease, an indicator variable, coded as 1 if the change in price from the last year is negative; Size = the log of total assets. NACC = normal accruals, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; ABACC = abnormal accruals, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; v = other information, scaled by market equity at the end of year t; BV it = book value;
v it = other information, scaled by market equity at the end of year t;
ABACC it = abnormal accruals, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t;
DISP it = dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts, measured as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in year t. ABACC it = abnormal accruals, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t; EP = earnings persistence, the first order autoregression coefficient for earnings over the last eight years; Loss = accounting loss, an indicator variable, coded as 1 when a loss occurs; PD = price decrease, an indicator variable, coded as 1 if the change in price from the last year is negative;
CFO it = cash flow from operations, estimated by the approach in Xie (2001) ; NACC it = normal accruals, estimated by the approach in Xie (2001) ; Size = the log of total assets. OF k = other factor, which is a set of LTG, Beta, EP, PREC, Loss, PD and Size; LTG = consensus analyst forecasts of long-run growth, measured in the month following earnings announcement; Beta = beta, estimated by the market model with daily return for year t-1;
Notes:
it = dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts, measured as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in year t; j = 2 if firms that satisfy analyst forecasts generate negative abnormal returns; v it = other information, scaled by market equity at the end of year t; BV it = book value;
